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REVENGE OR MERCY? SOME THOUGHTS
ABOUT SURVIVOR OPINION EVIDENCE IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Joseph L. Hoffmannt
INTRODUCTION
In Payne v. Tennessee, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Con-
stitution does not generally prohibit the survivors of a murder victim
from providing "victim impact" statements during the penalty phase
of a capital trial, ' reversing a decision made only a few years earlier in
Booth v. Maryland.2 The Court decided that brief descriptions of the
victim's attributes and value to society,", as well as information about
the impact of the murder on the survivors and the community at
large, 4 could be relevant to the capital sentencing decision and would
not necessarily inject an inappropriate amount of emotion or ven-
geance into the sentencing hearing.5
The Court in Payne acknowledged, however, that there was a
third kind of victim impact evidence, also prohibited by its earlier de-
cision in Booth, that might pose a different set of concerns. 6 This third
kind of evidence-the opinion of the survivors about what the defen-
dant's punishment should be 7-was not at issue in Payne, and thus the
Court did not reexamine its earlier prohibition of this evidence in
Booth.8 Since Payne, the Court has not revisited this issue, apparently
leaving intact its earlier holding in Booth that such opinion evidence is
inadmissible as a matter of Eighth Amendment law.9
t Harry Pratter Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
1 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
2 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
3 I will refer to this kind of victim impact evidence as "victim description" evidence.
4 I will refer to this kind of victim impact evidence as "survivor impact" evidence.
5 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825-27; id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 See id. at 830 n.2.
7 I will refer to this kind of victim impact evidence, which is the primary subject of
this Article, as "survivor opinion" evidence.
8 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2 ("Booth also held that the admission of a victim's
family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. No evidence of the latter sort was
presented at the trial in this case.").
9 But see Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital
Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 517, 528-33 (2000) (chronicling numerous post-Payne lower-court
cases in which survivor opinion evidence was admitted, usually on the ground that Payne
either implicitly overruled Booth or at least undermined the prohibition in Booth against
survivor opinion evidence).
REVENGE OR MERCY?
Many persuasive arguments suggest that the Court erred when it
revived the constitutionality of the first two kinds of victim impact evi-
dence in Payne.t0 In this Comment, I will agree with the overall view
that victim description evidence and survivor impact evidence gener-
ally should be excluded from capital sentencing hearings-except,
perhaps, after the sentencer has already reached its decision.
The main thrust of my Comment, however, will raise and discuss
several issues relating to the third kind of victim impact evidence: sur-
vivor opinion evidence. Academic literature seldom discusses such ev-
idence, and what little discussion there is suggests that academic
opposition to its admissibility is virtually unanimous. Nevertheless, I
would like to pose the controversial question of whether survivor opin-
ion evidence should be allowed to play a more significant role in capi-
tal sentencing. Although numerous arguments can be made against
the admissibility of survivor opinion evidence," t there is another side
to the question, and strong arguments can also be made in support of
admissibility. 2 At a minimum, I hope to provide provocative food for
thought about this subject, and to suggest that at least in some re-
spects, the Court's current position on the constitutionality of victim
impact evidence may be backwards.
I
THE PROBLEMS WITH VICTIM DESCRIPTION EVIDENCE AND
SURVIVOR IMPACT EVIDENCE
Numerous commentators have criticized the Court's decision in
Payne to reopen the door to victim impact evidence and allow victim
description and survivor impact testimony.'" The arguments against
10 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Speeding in Reverse: An Anecdotal View of Why Victim
Impact Testimony Should Not Be Driving Capital Prosecutions, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 555, 564-66
(2003); Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Statements: Hard to Find the Real Rules, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 543, 554 (2003).
11 See infra Part I.
12 See infra Part II.
13 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 361 (1996) [hereinafter Empathy]; Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know
About Victim Impact Statements, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 545; Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Clo-
sure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599 (2000)
[hereinafter Closure]; Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering: A Personal Reflection and a Victim-
Centered Critique, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 21 (1992); Teree E. Foster, Beyond Victim Impact
Evidence: A Modest Proposal, 45 HASTINs LJ. 1305 (1994); Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence
of Victimhood, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 77 (1992); Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem
with Victim Impact Statements, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17 (2000); Wayne A. Logan, Through
the Past Darkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 41
ARrz. L. REv. 143 (1999);James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in a
Capital Trial: Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JuST. 1 (1995); Catherine Bendor,
Recent Development, Defendants' Wrongs and Victims'Rights: Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597 (1991), 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 219 (1992); Amy K. Phillips, Note, Thou Shalt Not
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
admission of such testimony seem to fall into several distinct
categories.
First, some argue that victim impact evidence encourages capital
sentencers to base their sentencing decisions on the individual charac-
teristics of the victim, which leads to the imposition of different pun-
ishments for similar crimes, depending on the perceived value of the
respective victims. 14 Concern over this issue likely played an impor-
tant role in the Court's decision in Booth. Earlier in the same Term,
the Court ruled in McCleskey v. Kemp 15 that the Georgia death penalty
system was constitutional despite compelling statistical proof of a
"race of the victim" effect in which killers of white victims were more
likely to receive a death sentence than killers of black victims.' 6 Al-
though Justice Powell authored both the McCleskey and Booth opinions,
he noted in Booth, without even citing McCleskey, that victim impact
evidence might encourage capital sentencers to discriminate between
victims. 17 Although I continue to be amazed at the irony that the
Court would uphold a Georgia statute that was proved to operate in a
discriminatory manner while striking down, in the same Term, a Mary-
land procedure based on unproven speculation about such discrimi-
Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRiM.
L. REV. 93 (1997).
For rarer opposing views, see, for example, Paul G. Cassell, Barbarians at the Gates? A
Reply to the Critics of the Victims'Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 479; Edna Erez, Who's
Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment and Enhancement
ofJustice, 1999 CRIM. L. REV. 545; David D. Friedman, Should the Characteristics of Victims and
Criminals Count?: Payne v. Tennessee and Two Views of Efficient Punishment, 34 B.C. L. REV.
731 (1993).
14 See, e.g., Bandes, Empathy, supra note 13, at 405-08 (noting that "[v]ictim impact
statements permit, and indeed encourage, invidious distinctions about the personal worth
of victims" and that "[i]n this capacity, they are at odds with the principle that every per-
son's life is equally precious, and that the criminal law will value each life equally when
punishing those who grievously assault human dignity"); Cecil A. Rhodes, The Victim Impact
Statement and Capital Crimes: Trial byJuiy and Death by Character, 21 S.U. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994)
(noting that "[t]he arbitrary and capricious manner in the imposition of the death penalty
could be easily exacerbated based on whether the victim was a person of high esteem and
character" and explaining that "the imposition of death will be determined by the charac-
ter of the victim, and not the moral guilt, blameworthiness, and the individual character of
the defendant and the circumstances of the crime").
15 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
16 See id. at 312-13. The McCleskey litigation was based on the so-called Baldus Study,
in which Professor David C. Baldus discovered a statistically significant race-of-the-victim
effect in Georgia death penalty cases. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). The McCleskey Court stated that
it "assume[d] the [Baldus] study is valid statistically," and based its decision on that as-
sumption. 481 U.S. at 291 n.7.
17 See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506 n.8 (1987) ("We are troubled by the impli-
cation that defendants whose victims were assets to their community are more deserving of
punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy. Of course, our sys-
tem of justice does not tolerate such distinctions."), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991).
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nation, it seems clear that the two cases were related in the Court's
collective (or at least in Justice Powell's individual) mind.
A second argument against admitting victim impact evidence is
that it allows for disparate treatment of defendants based on the rela-
tive articulateness and persuasiveness of the survivors.1 8 Some survi-
vors can tell a compelling story about the victim and the effect of the
crime, while others-perhaps less educated or simply more reticent-
cannot. In at least a few cases, well-to-do survivors have even hired
lawyers to tell their stories for them at capital sentencing hearings,
further exacerbating the disparities created by Payne.1 9
A third criticism of Payne's holding on the admissibility of victim
impact evidence is that such evidence often does not relate to the le-
gitimate reasons for which society chooses to punish a defendant.2 1 In
many capital cases, the defendant knows little about the individual
victim at the time of the murder.2 1 Although all defendants should
18 See, e.g., id. at 505-06 ("Certainly the degree to which a family is willing and able to
express its grief is irrelevant to the decision whether a defendant, who may merit the death
penalty, should live or die."); Bandes, Empathy, supra note 13, at 398 ("[W]hen our society
is choosing which heinous murderers to kill and which to spare, its gaze ought to be care-
fully fixed on the harm they have caused and their moral culpability for that harm, not on
irrelevant fortuities such as the . . . articulateness . . . of their victims or their victims'
families." (emphasis omitted)); Rhodes, supra note 14, at 27 ("The arbitrary and capricious
manner in the imposition of the death penalty could be easily exacerbated based on ...
whether the victim's survivors were articulate and able to emote with conviction.").
19 See William Hauptman, Note, Lethal Reflection: New York's New Death Penalty and Vic-
tim Impact Statements, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 439, 476 (1997).
20 See, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05; Ashley Paige Dugger, Note, Victim Impact Evidence
in Capital Sentencing: A Histoiy of Incompatibility, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 399-400 (1996).
21 Most murders are committed by persons well known to their victims. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUsrICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, INTI-
MATE HOMICIDE, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/intimates.htm (last visited Oct.
26, 2002). But so-called "stranger murders" are relatively more likely than most other
kinds of murders to lead to the imposition of the death penalty, precisely because such
murders are more shocking and engender greater fear among law-abiding members of
society. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DIS-
PARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING 45 (1989) (noting three non-racial characteristics most
likely to lead to death sentences: (1) multiple victims, (2) felony murder, and (3) stranger
murder); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the
Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 769 (1983) ("[M]urders
involving strangers are more likely to be death penalty cases than murders among ac-
quaintances or primary relations."). Phyllis Crocker notes:
Studies of those on death row show that three primary features distinguish
the murders for which a defendant is likely to be sentenced to death. The
predominant categories are felony-murder, murder by a stranger, and in-
terracial murders where the defendant is African-American and the victim
is white. In each category, the percentage of individuals on death row is
disproportionately large compared to the corresponding percentage of
murders in that group overall. The common ground these characteristics
share is a fear of the stranger, in a non-intimate setting .... [These statis-
tics] show that the death penalty is reserved for that which we fear most-
felony-murders by strangers-and not that which actually happens most
often and presents the greatest threat.
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assume that their victims are worthy human beings and that their
crimes will leave bereaved survivors, victim impact evidence-to the
extent that it individualizes the victim based on characteristics about
which the defendant was unaware at the time of the crime-leads to
capital sentencing based on factors "wholly unrelated to the blame-
worthiness of a particular defendant."22 This, in turn, undermines
both the deterrent and the 'Just deserts" retributive purposes of
punishment. 23
Fourth among the litany of objections to Payne is the likelihood
that such evidence, especially if presented directly by survivors on the
witness stand, will lead to capital sentencing decisions based on emo-
tions and vengeance. 24 Although such feelings probably cannot be
eliminated from capital trials, Furman v. Georgia,25 Gregg v. Georgia,26
and the entire Eighth Amendment body of jurisprudence developed
by the Court in the twenty-five years since those two decisions, stand
for the proposition that the imposition of the death penalty should
be rational and even-handed. 27 Payne has arguably taken us a step
backward in this respect.
Finally, some critics have suggested that Payne would lead to an
unseemly, and perhaps even damaging, battle when defendants seek
to rebut the victim impact evidence introduced by the prosecution. 28
The spectre of widespread "mini trials" on the character and value of
the victim, or, relatedly, the problem of self-inflicted wounds by de-
fendants who seek to rebut such evidence and thereby alienate the
jury, may or may not have materialized in the years since Payne was
Phyllis L. Crocker, Crossing the Line: Rape-Murder and the Death Penalty, 26 Oio N.U. L. REV.
689, 695, 702 (2000) (footnote omitted).
22 Booth, 482 U.S. at 504.
23 Neither the deterrence theory nor the "just deserts" retributive theory of punish-
ment generally would support the idea of allowing a defendant to be sentenced to death
(or, for that matter, to a longer term of imprisonment) on the basis of factors about which
the defendant was not aware. An exception might be a case in which the defendant should
have been, but was not, aware of some aggravating factor. In addition, theories of punish-
ment that focus more directly on the harm to society caused by the defendant's crime
would support the imposition of the death penalty for factors about which the defendant
was not aware.
24 See, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09; Bandes, Empathy, supra note 13, at 393-402; Katie
Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Victim's Right or Victim's Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV.
187, 222-23 (1995).
25 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
27 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("It is of vital
importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death
sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."); see also
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126 (1991) (same); California v. Brown, 475 U.S. 1301,
1304 (1986) (same).
28 See, e.g., Booth, 482 U.S. at 506-07; Rhodes, supra note 14, at 28; Long, supra note
24, at 223 & n.220.
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decided. 29 However, these troubling scenarios have undoubtedly oc-
curred in at least some capital trials, and the potential for them re-
mains a substantial concern.
Based on all of these arguments, I find compelling the case for
overturning Payne and returning to the situation in which more-than-
de-minimis victim description and survivor impact evidence is consti-
tutionally inadmissible. 30 If survivors have a sufficiently strong psycho-
logical need to deliver such testimony, as a number of studies and
commentators suggest,31 then survivors should have the right to ad-
dress the defendant after his or her sentence has been determined. 32
At this time, the survivors can say whatever they wish concerning the
victim, the crime, and the impact of the crime on their lives. This
alternative could serve the same cathartic purpose, but without creat-
ing any of the serious adverse effects described above.
II
A HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSAL
What about the one category of victim impact evidence that re-
mains constitutionally inadmissible even after Payne? Despite a few
glaring instances in which state courts have allowed this kind of victim
impact evidence, notwithstanding the undisturbed holding of Booth,33
courts generally exclude from capital sentencing hearings the opin-
ions of a murder victim's survivors about exactly what punishment the
defendant should receive.3 4 Moreover, academic literature rarely dis-
cusses the topic of survivor opinion evidence, and the tone of any such
29 See Erez, supra note 13, at 549.
30 Even during the brief period when victim description and survivor impact evidence
was constitutionally inadmissible under Booth, it was generally understood that a limited
amount of such evidence could be introduced into a capital trial, as part of the res gestae of
the crime, without necessarily creating a constitutional problem. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 507
n.10 ("Similar types of information may well be admissible because they relate directly to
the circumstances of the crime.").
31 See Erez, supra note 13, at 550-53 (citing studies and articles that support the pro-
position that survivors have a psychological need to present survivor impact evidence).
32 At least some states have recently revised their capital sentencing systems to delay
the introduction of victim impact evidence until after the sentencer has already reached its
sentencing decision. See, e.g., INn. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2) (2002) ("After a court pro-
nounces sentence, a representative of the victim's family and friends may present a state-
ment regarding the impact of the crime on family and friends. The impact statement may
be submitted in writing or given orally by the representative. The statement shall be given
in the presence of the defendant.").
33 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 9, at 528-33 (citing various cases in which evidence of
victims' survivors' opinions regarding sentencing has been introduced).
34 See id. at 519 ("In the capital sentencing realm ... the courts have been considera-
bly less willing to permit the sentencing authority to consider sentence opinion testimony
from victims (or, more commonly, their survivors).").
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discussion usually suggests that no reasonable arguments support ad-
mitting such evidence. 35
I believe, however, that we have given insufficient thought to this
third kind of victim impact evidence, and that upon further reflection,
reasonable and persuasive arguments exist in favor of allowing the in-
troduction of at least some form of such evidence. What I would like
to suggest, as a starting point for further discussion, is the following
entirely hypothetical proposal.
At or near the conclusion of the sentencing hearing in any capital
case, the trial judge should be required to ask each of the victim's
surviving immediate family members about his or her opinion as to
the sentence that the defendant should receive.3 6 Based on each sur-
vivor's answers, the trial judge should then ensure that the sentencer
gives these survivor opinions appropriate consideration.3 7 Assuming
that the sentencer is ajury, the trial judge should proceed to give the
jury one of the following three alternative instructions, depending on
each survivor's expressed opinion about the appropriate sentence for
the defendant:
(1) At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the victim's
IMr./Ms. _, was given the opportunity to make a
gesture of mercy toward the defendant by asking that you, the jury,
not sentence the defendant to death. Mr./Ms. chose
not to make such a gesture of mercy, and instead expressed support
for sentencing the defendant to death. You may take the opinion of
Mr./Ms. into consideration in reaching your sen-
tencing decision. Ultimately, however, the final decision concern-
ing the defendant's punishment is up to you, the jury, and you must
make whatever sentencing decision you believe is correct.
(2) At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the victim's
__ , Mr./Ms. , chose to make a gesture of mercy
toward the defendant by asking that you, the jury, not sentence the
defendant to death. In reaching your sentencing decision, you may
take into consideration the opinion of Mr./Ms. _ that
the defendant should be treated mercifully and should not be sen-
tenced to death. Ultimately, however, the final decision concerning
the defendant's punishment is up to you, the jury, and you must
make whatever sentencing decision you believe is correct.
35 See sources cited supra note 13.
36 I would suggest a very narrow definition of "survivors" to include only the father,
mother, siblings, children, and spouse or life partner of the victim. Ideally the survivors
should observe the entire proceedings, during which they would learn not only of the
horrible facts of the crime but also of the defendant's mitigation case. But courts probably
cannot and should not require this.
37 If one or more survivors did not observe the entire proceedings, including the
defendant's mitigation case, then perhaps the sentencer should be informed of that fact so
that the sentencer can appropriately discount the weight of the survivor opinion evidence.
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(3) At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the victim's
__ , Mr./Ms. - , was given the opportunity to make a
gesture of mercy toward the defendant by asking that you, the jury,
not sentence the defendant to death. Mr./Ms. chose
to express no view whatsoever about whether the defendant should
be sentenced to death. This means that the final decision concern-
ing the defendant's punishment is entirely up to you, the jury, and
you must make whatever sentencing decision you believe is correct.
The judge should give instructions to the jury only after the jury
has already determined that the defendant is legally eligible for the
death penalty, but before it has rendered its final discretionary deci-
sion about whether to impose the death penalty. Using the terminol-
ogy common to most capital sentencing systems, this means that the
judge should not allow the survivor opinion evidence to influence the
jury's required factual finding of the existence of one or more aggra-
vating circumstances, but instead should only allow it to influence the
jury's weighing of those aggravating circumstances against any possi-
ble mitigating circumstances. 38
Only after sentencing should the survivors be able to describe the
victim and the impact of the crime on them and on the community. If
they wish, the survivors should be allowed to address the defendant
directly; if they do not wish to address the defendant directly, they
should be allowed to provide written statements that the trial judge
would read into the record in the defendant's presence.39
III
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
SURVIVOR OPINION EVIDENCE
The best argument in favor of allowing a limited form of survivor
opinion evidence to be admitted in capital cases is the potential thera-
peutic effect on the survivors. We must examine studies of victimiza-
tion and its aftermath with a critical eye, because to assume that all
victims are the same, or that all victims would benefit from the same
kind of post-crime treatment would be a grievous mistake.4°, However,
38 Cf Patrick E. Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1047, 1057-58, 1060, 1065 (1991) (favorably discussing case law which has divided capital
sentencing into two distinct phases: the determination of death eligibility, which arguably
the trial judge should make, and the discretionary decision whether to impose the death
penalty, which the jury should make).
39 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2) (2002) (allowing the victim's family and
friends to present impact statements in writing or orally in the presence of the defendant).
40 In support of the notion that victims and their responses are unique, Robert Mos-
teller states:
Victims are not monolithic. For some, healing and even reconciliation are
attainable. However, for others, particularly the victims of the most serious
crimes, nothing can give them what they want-to be victims no longer.
2003]
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one clearly common, and potentially debilitating, aspect of victimiza-
tion is the severe and ongoing loss of control that many victims experi-
ence. 4' This loss of control is most salient, of course, for the actual
victims of the crimes themselves. Nonetheless, survivors of murder
victims also seem likely to suffer from similar feelings of powerless-
ness, and society should do whatever it reasonably can to help them.
Allowing survivors to play a more active role in determining a de-
fendant's sentence might be seen in this way as a form of "psychic
restitution," in which the defendant gives something back-in this
case, a certain measure of predictability concerning his or her sen-
tencing determination-in order to compensate for the loss that has
been sustained by the victim and, derivatively, by the victim's survi-
vors.4 2 By providing survivors with even a small degree of control over
the defendant's fate, it may be possible to help them regain their
sense of agency in general. 43 This approach will not help all survivors,
but it may help some of them, and it therefore warrants society's seri-
ous consideration.
A related, but generally overlooked, argument in favor of admit-
ting survivor opinion evidence is that such admissibility would en-
hance the ability of at least some survivors to extend mercy and even
forgiveness to the defendants who killed their loved ones. 44 This en-
hanced ability could be beneficial in two different ways. First, it could
Each new chance to exert control or to affect punishment becomes virtually
an obligation to seek justice for a lost loved one or to continue a quest for
wholeness.
Robert P. Mosteller, Popular Justice, 109 HARV. L. REV. 487, 494 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VIcrIMs' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)). For a
thoughtful analysis of victimization and the process of victim healing, see generally Lynne
N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985). Professor Hen-
derson also emphasizes the fact that victims do not necessarily react uniformly to their
situation. Id. at 964 ("Answers to the questions of death, meaning, responsibility, and isola-
tion vary from individual to individual,just as behavioral and psychological manifestations
of these existential issues differ from victim to victim.").
41 See Henderson, supra note 40, at 958 ("[F]ear of revictimization, feelings of help-
nessness, loss of a sense of control over one's destiny, and lack of security become 'typical'
reactions to an intrusive confrontation with death." (footnotes omitted)).
42 See David A. Starkweather, The Retributive Theory of 'just Deserts" and Victim Participa-
tion in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 864-67 (1992) (discussing the theory of "psychic
restitution").
43 See Erez, supra note 13, at 551-53 ("With proper safeguards, the overall experience
of providing input can be positive and empowering. . . .One of the major aims of the
victim movement, and the driving force behind it, was to help victims overcome their sense
of powerlessness and reduce their feelings that the system is uncaring.").
44 1 use the term "mercy" to describe leniency that is offered to defendants, notwith-
standing the fact that they may not deserve it. I use the term "forgiveness" to describe the
internal process by which people let go of the anger and feelings of vengeance held against
someone who has wronged them. It is possible, therefore, for a victim (or a survivor) to be
merciful to a defendant without actually forgiving that defendant. See generallyJEFFRIE G.
MURPHY &JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988) (exploring the meaning of for-
giveness and mercy in the criminal justice system).
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provide a very practical benefit for defendants in particular capital
cases, because the survivors' desire to extend mercy, forgiveness, or
both seems very likely to influence the jury's sentencing decision in
favor of life instead of the death penalty.
Admitting survivor opinion evidence could also provide a second
important benefit. It has often been suggested that responding merci-
fully or forgivingly might be more conducive to the crime victim's psy-
chological recovery than continuing to harbor feelings of vengeance
and anger. 45 If this is true, then it may be important to validate the
victim's (or, in this case, the victim's survivor's) choice by giving it at
least some weight in the sentencing process. Without such weight, the
choice to extend mercy-or to forgive the defendant-is essentially
costless (in real-world terms) and thus may be lacking in true moral
significance. 46 Stated differently, in order for the "choice to be
merciful" to be meaningful, the alternative-which is not to be
merciful-must also be meaningful. This means that the choice must
be communicated to the sentencer at a time when it still might make a
difference in the sentence.
Finally, admitting survivor opinion evidence would avoid the cur-
rent hypocrisy that allows many survivors to deliver victim impact state-
ments that are thinly disguised efforts to sway the jury's sentence
without violating the letter of Payne.47 The current situation encour-
45 On the subject of forgiveness and vengeance, Hannah Arendt states:
[F] orgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance, which acts in the form of
re-acting against an original trespassing, whereby far from putting an end
to the consequences of the first misdeed, everybody remains bound to the
process .... In contrast to revenge, . . [f]orgiving ... is the only reaction
which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, uncondi-
tioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its conse-
quences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 240-41 (1958); see also MURPHY & HAMPTON,
supra note 44, at 36-43 (defining forgiveness); Starkweather, supra note 42, at 865 (illus-
trating that Arendt's notion of forgiveness enables crime victims "to be restored
emotionally").
46 See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW ANDJUSTICE 6 (1987) (stating that in order for
individuals to be morally responsible for their actions, those actions must be "both free and
determinate"); see also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 44, at 36-37 (arguing that true, mor-
ally significant forgiveness requires an external effect on the "forgiver's relationship to the
wrongdoer").
47 See, for example, the prosecutor's closing argument in Payne, in which he com-
mented on the lifelong effects on Nicholas, the three-year-old survivor of the two murder
victims (who were his mother and younger sister):
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families involved
in this case .... But there is something that you can do for Nicholas.
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully. He's
going to want to know what happened. And he is going to know what hap-
pened to his baby sister and his mother. He is going to want to know what
type ofjustice was clone. He is going to want to know what happened. With
your verdict, you will provide the answer.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 815 (1991).
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ages survivors to conflate two separate goals: achieving personal ca-
tharsis by expressing their feelings about the victim and the crime to
the defendant, and exercising some control over the defendant's fate
by seeking to influence the jury. It would be preferable to keep these
two goals truly separate by allowing the second one to be pursued
directly, and in a less emotionally charged manner, while delaying
pursuit of the first (if such pursuit is desirable at all) to a time when it
would not produce the serious negative effects described above.
Moreover, even if the practical benefits are small, intellectual honesty
about such matters would seem to be an inherently worthwhile goal.
At the same time, any proposal to allow the introduction of survi-
vor opinion evidence undoubtedly would trigger numerous objec-
tions. The primary argument is that allowing such evidence might
overwhelm the jury's capability to make a reasoned and independent
capital sentencing determination, no matter how carefully such evi-
dence is presented to the jury.48 Although this is indeed a serious
concern, it should be evaluated in light of the current situation, in
which juries are generally free to assume 49 that the survivors would
prefer to see the defendant sentenced to death. 50
If most, or even many, capital sentencing juries currently specu-
late in this way about survivor opinion, then the proposed change may
actually improve the current situation. If the survivors would prefer to
see the defendant sentenced to death, then the proposed survivor-
opinion jury instructions would merely confirm the jury's specula-
tions. 5' If the survivors would prefer to extend mercy to the defen-
dant, however, then the proposed instructions would serve to correct
a serious misapprehension on the part of the jury. 52 If the survivors
are divided as to their preferred sentence, then the proposed instruc-
tions, which would have the net effect of juxtaposing one survivor's
48 See, e.g., Logan, supra note 9, at 540-43 (arguing that sentence opinion testimony
should be barred because it makes sentencing decisions arbitrary and capricious).
49 The only current exception to this is a capital case in which the jury is allowed to
receive evidence that the survivors do not wish to see the defendant sentenced to death.
Such cases occur, see, e.g., Frank Green, Merry for Killer Is Urged, RiciiMOND TIMEs-DisiArci,
July 1, 2001, at A-], LEXIS, News Library, Rchtmd File, but they are relatively rare.
50 Whether true or not as an empirical fact, this is the assumption that mostjuries are
likely to make, if they even think about survivor opinion. Some commentators believe that
such assumptions may be common among juries. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 9, at 545.
5 ! Moreover, requiring survivor opinions in favor of the death penalty to be presented
to the jury by the trial judge in dry and unemotional legal language might actually dimin-
ish the impact of such opinions on the jury's sentencing decision, especially when com-
pared to the jury's likely speculations about the vengeful feelings of the survivors.
52 Cf Wayne A. Logan, Declaring Life at the Crossroads of Death: Victims 'Anti-Death Penalty
Views and Prosecutors'Charging Decisions, 18 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1999, at 41, 41
(arguing that when deciding whether to seek the death penalty, prosecutors should respect
the views of murder victims who had previously executed a "declaration of life" in which
they ask for mercy in case they are murdered in the future).
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opinion against another's, would likely eliminate the issue from the
jury's consideration altogether. In any event, the proposed instruc-
tions would explicitly inform the jury that survivor opinion evidence is
only one of many considerations pertinent to the sentencing decision,
and that the ultimate decision must be made by the jury, not by the
survivors.
5 3
A second objection to admitting survivor opinion evidence is that
such evidence is improper at the capital sentencing stage because the
criminal justice system is designed to serve the interests of society as a
whole, not the interests of victims or survivors. 54 At one time this was
a virtual truism, but it no longer is. Over the past two decades, the
victims' rights movement has reminded us that crime victims are not
like the rest of us; instead, they rightfully occupy a special place within
the criminal justice system. Their opinions about such fundamental
issues as discretionary charging decisions, plea bargains, and
sentences should matter to the system, even if similar opinions ex-
pressed by the rest of us do not. The voices of crime victims (or their
survivors) should perhaps be muted, in order to prevent arbitrary or
irrational decisions, but those voices should not be completely
silenced.
A third and perhaps more subtle argument is that allowing survi-
vor opinion evidence might further victimize the survivors. This vic-
timization could occur if the survivors were to express a consensus
opinion about the defendant's sentence, only to see the jury ignore
that opinion. Although this prospect would be both possible and po-
tentially hurtful to the survivors, the victimization could be partially
mitigated by requiring the trial judge to inform the survivors-both
before and after they express their opinions about the sentence-that
even if their opinions do not produce the desired sentencing out-
come, they have nevertheless played an important role in the sentenc-
ing process by contributing their unique perspectives to that
process.55
53 See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann, Wheres the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Re-
sponsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 INn. L.J. 1137, 1157-58 (1995) (arguing that a trial
judge has "a positive duty to try to impress upon death penalty jurors the responsibility they
bear for the sentencing decision").
54 See, e.g., Bandes, Closure, supra note 13, at 1605-06 (asserting that although victims
sometimes obtain closure from the legal system, the legal system has goals and purposes
necessarily distinct from meeting the needs of the victim); Logan, supra note 9, at 540
(stating that sentence opinion testimony is irrelevant to reaching a "constitutionally valid,
'reasoned moral response"').
55 On this subject Edna Erez has stated:
Although some of those who thought their input was ignored showed a
lower level of satisfaction with justice because of raised expectations, this
issue need not be used as an argument against the proposition that [victim
impact statements] can increase victim satisfaction with justice. First, the
potential problem of heightening victim expectations can be resolved by
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Survivors might be further victimized if they disagreed about the
preferred sentence, because it could lead to intrafamilial fighting.56
Although these family arguments would be an unfortunate conse-
quence, such disagreements might occur whether or not the survivors
are allowed to express their opinions as part of the sentencing
process.
Finally, granting the survivors an opportunity to express their
opinions about the defendant's sentence might provide a motive for
the defendant (or a friend, family member, or the defendant's lawyer)
to contact the survivors, either before or during the trial, in an effort
to influence their opinions. Such contact, if for purposes other than
those legitimately related to the gathering of evidence for trial, would
likely have to be prohibited.
CONCLUSION
The current victim impact debate focuses almost exclusively on
two categories of victim impact evidence-victim description evidence
and survivor impact evidence-that were originally prohibited by
Booth, but later constitutionally revived by Payne. Even in that context,
several state legislatures and state courts have recently declined the
U.S. Supreme Court's invitation in Payne to reauthorize the introduc-
tion of such evidence. 57 Survivor opinion evidence, on the other
hand, has generally been either ignored completely or dismissed out
of hand. No serious proposal to allow the introduction of such evi-
dence is presently on the horizon, and no state legislature or state
court is likely, at least in the near future, to take the ideas expressed in
this Comment seriously.
Nevertheless, survivor opinion evidence deserves a more honora-
ble burial than it has received to date. Sincere concern for the survi-
vors of a murder victim, the recognition that at least some survivors
might wish to oppose the imposition of the death penalty, and simple
intellectual honesty about the reasons why many survivors seek to play
a larger role in capital sentencing all suggest that survivor opinion
evidence may have more legitimate value than we have generally been
willing to acknowledge.
explaining to victims that the [victim impact statement] is only one of the
factors judges use to determine the type and severity of penalties.
Erez, supra note 13, at 552-53 (footnote omitted).
56 Cf Foster, supra note 13, at 1318-19 (satirically proposing that victim survivors be
awarded the right to participate in the execution of the defendant, but noting that "con-
flicts among family members and loved ones" might arise).
57 See Brian j. Johnson, Note, The Response to Payne v. Tennessee: Giving the Victim's
Family a Voice in the Capital Sentencing Process, 30 IND. L. REv. 795, 803-07 (1997) (canvassing
state-law responses to Payne).
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